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Abstract
Industrial delicensing, which began in 1985 in India marked a discrete break from a past of
centrallyplannedindustrialdevelopment.Similarliberalizationepisodesaretakingplaceacross
the globe. We develop a simple Schumpeterian growth model to understand how ﬁrms respond
to the entry threat imposed by liberalization. The model emphasizes that ﬁrm responses, even
within the same industrial sector, are likely to be heterogeneous leading to an increase in
within industry inequality. Technologically advanced ﬁrms and those located in regions with
pro-business institutions are more likely to respond to the threat of entry by investing in new
technologies and production processes. Empirical analysis using a panel of three-digit state-
industry data from India for the period 1980–1997 conﬁrms that delicensing led to an increase
in within industry inequality in industrial performance. (JEL: F14, 012, 031)
1. Introduction
Economicliberalizationishappeningacrosstheglobe.Withinthesameindustrial
sector, ﬁrms that have different technological capabilities or that are located in
regionswithdifferenttypesofinstitutionsmayrespondinaheterogeneousmanner
to the competitive pressure imposed by the removal of barriers to entry during
liberalization episodes. In short, the effects of liberalization may be unequal—
some ﬁrms may beneﬁt whilst others suffer, leading to growing within industry
inequality in industrial performance. This paper looks directly at this issue from
both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. In doing so it departs from much
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of the recent literature that attempts to evaluate the average effects of economic
liberalization on industrial performance.1
To guide our research we construct a simple version of a Schumpeterian
growthmodelwithentrythreat.Howﬁrmsrespondtothisentrythreatbyinvesting
in new technologies and production processes will be determined by two sets of
factors, one internal to ﬁrms and the other external. Technological capability of
ﬁrms determines their ability to compete with potential entrants. Firms close
to the technological frontier will be incentivized to invest and innovate while
those far from frontier will be disincentivized. The institutional environment in
which ﬁrms operate, which is captured, for example, by the extent to which labor
institutionsarepro-employerinagivenregion,willalsoaffecttheextenttowhich
they respond to entry threats via investment and innovation. For these reasons,
as entry barriers come down with liberalization we expect to observe growing
divergence in economic performance across industries within the same industrial
sector but located in different regions of a country.
It is this core prediction of entry liberalization leading to rising within indus-
try inequality that we take to the data. To do this we exploit a three-digit state-
industry panel data set gathered by the Annual Survey of Industries in India for
the period 1980–1997. In the period since independence in 1947, India remained
arelativelyclosedeconomywithanextensiveroleforcentralplanningofindustry
via licensing and other instruments. The delicensing reforms of Rajiv Gandhi in
1985andthemoresubstantialentryliberalizationof1991markedadiscretebreak
with the past. To capture entry liberalization we construct a delicensing measure
that records when a given three-digit industry was delicensed. We then relate this
measuretoinequalityineconomicperformanceacrossthree-digitstate-industries
within the same three-digit industrial sector. This enables us to examine directly
whether the reduction in barriers to entry led to a divergence in industrial per-
formance across Indian states within the same three-digit industrial sector as is
predicted by the model.
Thepaperisstructuredasfollows.Section2presentssometheorythatenables
us to examine how the removal of barriers to entry affects industrial performance
depending on the technological capacity of ﬁrms and their institutional environ-
ment.Section3presentsempiricalanalysisofthelinkbetweenentryliberalization
and within industry inequality using an Indian three-digit state-industry panel for
the period 1980–1997. Section 4 concludes.
1. See, for example, Pavcnik (2002), Topalova (2004), and the survey in Tybout (2003). This paper
reviewsandhighlightsaspectsofrecentresearchpursuedinacompanionpaper(seeAghion,Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti 2004) to which the reader is referred.“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 293 — #3
Aghion et al. Inequality in Industrial Performance in India 293
2. The Model2
ConsiderthefollowingversionoftheSchumpeteriandiscrete-timemodelofAce-
moglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2005). The model economy consists of a set of
“states” (or regions) that differ in their factor endowments, distribution of pro-
ductivities across ﬁrms and labor market regulations.
All agents live for one period. In each period t a ﬁnal good (henceforth the
numeraire) is produced in each state by a competitive sector using a continuum
one of intermediate inputs, according to the technology:
ys,t =
1
α
 1
0
(As,t(ν))1−αxs,t(ν)αdν

.
xs,t(ν) is the quantity of intermediate input produced in sector ν, state s, and date
t,As,t(ν)isaproductivityparameterthatmeasuresthequalityoftheintermediate
input ν in producing the ﬁnal good, and α ∈ (0,1). The ﬁnal good can be used
eitherforconsumption,orasaninputintheprocessofproductionofintermediate
goods, or for investments in innovation. For simplicity, we drop the state index s
when this is not a source of confusion.
In each intermediate sector ν only one ﬁrm (a monopolist) is active in each
period, and property rights over intermediate ﬁrms are transmitted within dynas-
ties. A ﬁrm consists of an entrepreneur, who has the power to take decisions
concerning production and investments, workers that for simplicity we assume
to be in a ﬁxed number, and a technology to transform one unit of the ﬁnal good
into one unit of intermediate good of productivity At(ν).
Standard analysis (see Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2005) shows that
the surplus generated by this ﬁrm is equal to α
1
1−α(1−α
α )At(ν). Entrepreneurs
and workers split this surplus according to the Nash rule. The share appropriated
by each of the parties, say β and (1 − β), depend on their bargaining strengths,
which is assumed to depend on institutional features (state-speciﬁc labor legis-
lation). Let δ ≡ β · α
1
1−α(1 − α)/α. The equilibrium proﬁt appropriated by the
entrepreneur is, then:
πt(ν) = δAt(ν).
Also, substituting for the equilibrium production level of each intermediate
good, xt(ν), in the production function for ﬁnal output, we obtain the total output
level ytα
2α−1
1−α At where At ≡
 1
0 At(ν)dν is the average productivity in the state.
2. This model was ﬁrst developed in Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004).“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 294 — #4
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2.1. Technological States, Innovation, and Entry
In every period, and within each state, intermediate ﬁrms differ in terms of their
currentdistancetotheworld“technologicalfrontier”.Wedenotetheproductivity
ofthefrontiertechnologyattheendofperiodt by ¯ At andassumethatthisfrontier
grows at the exogenous rate g. More formally:
¯ At = ¯ At−1(1 + g).
At the beginning of period t (or, identically, at the end of period t − 1), the
leading ﬁrm in the production of a particular intermediate input can be in two
states: (i) “high-productivity” ﬁrms have a productivity level At−1(ν) = ¯ At−1,
namely,areatthecurrentfrontier;(ii)“low-productivity”ﬁrmshaveaproductivity
level At−1(ν) = ¯ At−2 namely, are one step behind it.
Before deciding their production plans, ﬁrms can undertake investments in
technology adoption to increase their productivity. Innovative investments have a
stochastic return. In case of success, the incumbent ﬁrm can adopt the next most
productivetechnology,i.e.,canincreaseitsproductivitybyafactor1+g andkeep
pace with the advancement of the technological frontier. The cost of technology
adoption is assumed to be quadratic in the probability of success and linear in the
level of technology:
ct(ν) =
1
2
z2
t At−1(ν),
where z is the probability of success of the investment. If instead the investment
is not successful (probability 1 − z), the ﬁrm produces with a productivity level
equal to its initial state.
We make the following assumptions about ﬁrms’ dynamics. If an advanced
ﬁrm is successful at t, it starts as an advanced ﬁrm at t +1. All other ﬁrms start as
backwardﬁrms(notethatthisimpliesthatﬁrmswitharealizedproductivityequal
to At−2 at t automatically upgrade their initial productivity due to some spillover
effect). However, in this case, with an exogenous probability h, the leader is
replacedbyanewﬁrmstartingasadvancedatt+1.Letat denotetheproportionof
“advanced”ﬁrmsatt,andzA denotetheinnovativeinvestmentofadvancedﬁrms.
Then the productivity distribution is characterized by the following dynamics:
at+1 = zA,tat + h(1 − zA,tat) = (1 − h)zA,tat + h,
implying the steady-state proportion of advanced ﬁrms being equal to
a∗ = h/[1 − zA(1 − h)].
Intermediate ﬁrms are subject to competition from outsiders. In particular,
we assume that, in every period, an outsider can operate a hit-and-run entry in“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 295 — #5
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the local market for a particular intermediate good.3 Outside ﬁrms observe the
outcome of the innovative investment of the local ﬁrm, and face the following
decision. They can either stay out of the market, or pay a small ﬁxed cost, ζ, and
be granted permission to sell in the local market with probability µ.4 Outsiders
are assumed to have the frontier productivity, ¯ At.
If an outsider enters and competes with a low productivity ﬁrm, it steals
all the market. If it competes with a high-productivity ﬁrm, however, Bertrand
competitiondrivestheproﬁtsofbothﬁrmstozero.Weassumetheparameterstobe
such that the outside ﬁrm will always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to try to enter if the market
iscontrolledbyalow-productivityﬁrm.However,theoutsiderwillnottrytoenter
if there is a high-productivity incumbent. Therefore, the probability of entry in
the market for input ν will be zero, if the local ﬁrm ν was initially “advanced”
and has undertaken a successful innovative investment. Else, the probability is µ.
2.2. Equilibrium Innovation Investments
We now consider the decisions of incumbent producers in each of the techno-
logical states. Recall that all agents live for one period only, therefore incumbent
producers born at date t maximize the expected proﬁts accruing at the end of the
same period t.This is a useful simpliﬁcation that avoids the need to solve more
complicated dynamic problems.
Backward ﬁrms choose their investment so as to maximize expected proﬁts,
as given by:
max
z
{δ[z(1 − µ) ¯ At−1 + (1 − z)(1 − µ) ¯ At−2]−
1
2
z2 ¯ At−2},
whose solution yields:
z = δ(1 = µ)g = zB. (1)
Recall that backward ﬁrms can only make proﬁts if there is no entry (probability
1 − µ). The productivity is ¯ At−1 if the investment is successful (probability z)
and ¯ At−2 if the investment is not successful (probability 1 − z).5
3. AvariantofthismodelwithpermanententryisdevelopedbyAghion,Blundell,Grifﬁth,Howitt,
and Brantl (2004), who then confront it with U.K. ﬁrm level data on entry threat, actual entry,
patenting, and productivity growth.
4. We can interpret µ as the probability of success of an application for a license or in overcoming
other legal barriers to starting production.
5. One could generalize the model to allow for the possibility that through aggressive innovative
investments backward ﬁrms can catchup with the frontier. This would create scope for defensive
innovation from backward ﬁrms when the probability of entry increases. As long as the probability
that backward ﬁrms can make large jumps is sufﬁciently low, this extension would not change
qualitatively the comparative statics of the model.“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 296 — #6
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Advanced ﬁrms choose their innovation investment in order to solve the
following program:
max
z
{δ[z ¯ At + (1 − z)(1 − µ) ¯ A)t − 1]=
1
2
z2 ¯ At−1}
whose solution yields:
z = δ(g + µ) = zA (2)
In this case, incumbent ﬁrms can prevent entry by successfully adopting the
last technology, which occurs with probability z. In this case, the local ﬁrm has
a productivity level ¯ At. The ﬁrm also retains the market if the investment is not
successful,butthereisnoentry.Thiseventoccurswithprobability(1−µ)(1−z).
In this case the ﬁrm’s productivity is ¯ At−1.
We interpret an increase of the entry threat, µ as a liberalization reform.
Straightforward differentiation of equilibrium innovation intensities with respect
to µ yields:
∂zA
∂µ
= δ>0 and
∂zB
∂µ
=− δg < 0. (3)
In other words, increasing the entry threat (e.g., through slashing barriers to entry
via delicensing) encourages innovation in advanced ﬁrms and discourages it in
backward ﬁrms. The intuition for these comparative statics is immediate. The
higher the threat of entry, the more important innovations will be in helping
incumbent ﬁrms already close to the technological frontier to retain the local
market. However, ﬁrms that are already far behind the frontier have no chance
to win over a potential entrant. Hence, a higher threat of entry will only lower
the expected net gain from innovation, thereby reducing the incentive for the
incumbent to invest in innovation.
Next,considertheeffectsofchangesinlabormarketregulationsoninnovative
investments. “Pro-worker” regulations are captured by smaller δ s, as discussed
previously. It is immediate that
∂zA
∂δ
= g + µ>0 and
∂zB
∂δ
= (1 − µ)g > 0.
Hence, pro-worker labor market regulations discourage innovation in all ﬁrms,
but they do so to a larger extent in advanced ﬁrms.
2.3. Predictions for State-Industries
We have so far assumed, for simplicity, that there is only one sector of activity.
The stylized model presented here can be reinterpreted as describing a single
industry rather than the economy as a whole. Each state-industry should then be“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 297 — #7
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viewedasan“island”populatedbyasetofcompetitiveﬁnalproducersandasetof
noncompetitive differentiated intermediated producers. The products of different
industries are perfect substitutes in consumption, and the price of all ﬁnal goods
is set equal to unity. Thus, the equilibrium described in this section, as well as its
comparative statics, can be regarded as the equilibrium of a state-industry. The
average productivity of ﬁrms in state-industry is Ai,s,t =
 1
0 Ai,s,t(ν)dν.
Steady-stateproductivitydifferencesacrossstate-industriesareassumedtobe
driven by idiosyncratic state-industry effects affecting the exogenous probability
of upgrading, h, and in the state-speciﬁc parameter β labor market regulation).
More formally,
a∗
i,s =
hi,s
1 − zAi,s(1 − hi,s)
,
wherehi,s = h+εi,s.Thisrepresentationallowsustointroduceinaparsimonious
way steady-state productivity differences across state-industries: more advanced
state-industries (conditional on labor market regulations) are those with high
hi,s’s. The model’s predictions for ﬁrm behavior now hold at the level of state-
industries (see Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti 2004).
3. The Unequal Effects of Liberalization6
StatecontrolofIndianindustrywasenshrinedintheIndustries(Developmentand
Regulation) Act of 1951 whereby ﬁrms required a licence in order to establish a
new factory, to expand capacity by more than 25% of existing levels, or to man-
ufacture a new product. These controls were supplemented with state controls
on ﬁnancial intermediation, imports, foreign direct investment, and high tariff
and nontariff barriers as part of an overall strategy of centrally planned industrial
development.Licensingenabledthestatetocontrolthepatternofindustrialdevel-
opment across Indian states and to address regional disparities. India lived under
this“LicenseRaj”forthebulkofitspostcolonialhistory;however,slowgrowthin
thelate-1960sand1970s(seeTable1)generatedpressureforchangeculminating
in Rajiv Gandhi’s reforms of the mid-1980s where one-third of Indian three-digit
manufacturing industries were exempted from industrial licensing. A growing
ﬁscal and balance of payment crisis (which necessitated intervention by the IMF)
andtheassassinationofRajivGandhi,whichledtotheappointmentofNarasimha
Rao to Prime Minister and of Manmohan Singh to Finance Minister precipated
moredramaticinternalandexternalliberalizationin1991.Compulsoryindustrial
licensing was abolished in all but a few industries so that, as of 1991, 85% of all
three-digit manufacturing industries were delicensed. There were also signiﬁcant
6. This section is based on Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004).“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 298 — #8
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Table 1. Economic growth in India, 1960–1997.
Annual growth Annual growth registered
Annual growth SDP manufacturing SDP manufacturing
per capita per capita SDP per capita
1960–1970 2.82% 1.89% 2.58%
1970–1980 1.53% 3.90% 3.39%
1980–1985 2.90% 4.17% 5.78%
1985–1990 3.76% 5.68% 6.92%
1991–1997 4.06% 6.90% 8.19%
Notes: SDP denotes real state domestic product. Nominal domestic product in each state is deﬂated using a rural-urban
population weighted average of the consumer price indices for industrial workers and agricultural laborers. Registered
manufacturing corresponds to all factories with more than 10 employees with power or more than 20 employees without
power. The data source is Besley and Burgess (2004).
reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers and a loosening of controls on imports
and foreign investment.
State panel data for the period 1960–1997 from Besley and Burgess (2004)
suggeststhateconomicliberalizationwasassociatedwithrisingeconomicgrowth,
particularly in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1).7 Figure 1 examines the
evolution of cross-state inequality by graphing out the standard deviation of log
registered and unregistered manufacturing output per capita for the years 1960 to
1997. The distinction between these two sectors is germane as the unregistered
(informal) sector of small ﬁrms is not subject to licensing controls whereas the
registered (formal) sector of larger ﬁrms is.8 Inequality in registered manufac-
turing output declines from 1960 until 1985 and then increases up to 1997. In
line with the predictions of the model we see that delicensing post-1985 is asso-
ciated with rising inequality in the regulated manufacturing sector.9 In contrast,
inequality in the unregulated manufacturing sector rises across the whole period.
Using Indian Annual Survey of Industries data we can carry out a similar
exercise looking at inequality across states within three-digit registered manu-
facturing industries. To do this we calculate the standard deviation across states
of log gross output and output per employee within a three-digit manufacturing
industry for each year between 1980 and 1997. Figure 2 graphs the three-year
movingaverageofthemedianofthesewithin-industrystandarddeviationsacross
this period. Consistent with the model we observe growing inequality following
the 1985 delicensing reforms, with the within industry inequalizing effects of
liberalization becoming particularly strong post-1991.10
7. See Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and Topalova (2004).
8. Manufacturingﬁrmswithmorethantenemployeeswithpowerorwithmorethantwentywithout
are classiﬁed as registered whereas ﬁrms below these cutoffs are classiﬁed as unregistered.
9. Thefallingtrendpre-1985reﬂectstheuseoflicensingandotherstatecontrolstoreduceregional
disparities in industrial development.
10. These ﬁndings concerning aggregate and within-industry inequality are robust to considering
alternative measures of dispersion such as the coefﬁcient of variation or the difference in log output,“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 299 — #9
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Table 2. Delicencing, entry and within-industry inequality.
12 3 4 5
Number of St dev St dev St dev St dev
factories In(Y) In(Y/L) In(TFPI) In(TFP2)
Industry delicenced 87.581*** 0.131*** 0.066*** 0.051** 0.052**
(36.311) (0.040) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
R-squared 0.97 0.65 0.64 0.37 0.37
Industry ﬁxed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Notes:sampleisanindustry-timepanelonthree-digitmanufacturingindustriesduring1980–1997fromtheIndianAnnual
Survey of Industries (ASI). See Aghion, Burgess, Zilibotti, and Redding (2004). Industry delicenced is an industry-time
measureofdelicensing,whichtakesthevalue1iftheindustryisdelicensedinaparticularyearand0otherwise.Numberof
factoriesisthenumberoffactoriesactiveinanindustryandyear.StDevdenotesthestandarddeviationacrossstateswithin
anindustryandyear. In(Y)islogrealgrossoutput.In(Y/L)islogrealgrossoutputperemployee.In(TFPI)islogsuperlative
index Total Factor Productivity. In(TFP2) is log superlative index Total Factor Productivity, including nonproduction and
production workers as separate factors of production. Output, employees and other factor inputs are from the ASI. Price
deﬂators are from the Handbook of Industrial Statistics. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedaticity robust and
adjusted for clustering on industry.
*signiﬁcant at 10%.
** signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Todirectlylinkwithinthree-digitindustryinequalitytoindustrialdelicensing
we run regressions of the form:
yit = delicit + dt + νi + uit
where i denotes a three-digit registered manufacturing industry and t year, yit
is an economic outcome of interest, delicit is a 0/1 dummy that switches on
when a three-digit industry is delicensed, dt is a year dummy that controls for
common macro-economic shocks and will capture the overall effects of the 1985
and 1991 liberalizations across all three-digit industries, ηi is an industry ﬁxed
effect that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across three-digit industries,
and uit is a stochastic error. To allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
in the error term over time, the standard errors are corrected for clustering at
the three-digit industry level. This is a “differences in differences” speciﬁcation,
wheretheeffectofdelicensingisidentiﬁedfromthedifferentialchangeovertime
in the economic outcome in industries that delicense relative to industries where
compulsory industrial licensing is retained.
The delicit measure corresponds to the probability of entry measure µ in the
model. We would therefore expect industrial delicensing to encourage entry.11
Column (1) of Table 2 conﬁrms this where we see that delicensing increases the
log output per capita, or log output per worker at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the cross-state
distribution.
11. This view is conﬁrmed in the Government of India’s own ofﬁcial reports (e.g., Reports of
the 1969 Industrial Licencing Policy Enquiry Committee and the 1985 Narasimhan Committee on
Replacement of Physical by Financial Controls).“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 300 — #10
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Figure 1. Standard deviation in log manufacturing SDP.
numberoffactoriesinathree-digitindustry.Wearenowinapositiontolinkentry
liberalization to inequality in industrial performance within three-digit industries
across states. Columns (2) and (3) shows that delicensing leads to an increase
in within industry inequality in output and output per employee. Columns (4)
and (5) show a similar pattern for two superlative index measures of total factor
productivity.
This ﬁnding of rising inequality following entry liberalization is consistent
with the theoretical model that emphasizes how a common reform may have
uneven effects on the performance of state-industries within a given industrial“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 301 — #11
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Figure 2. Median within industry standard deviation.
sector. In Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2004) we explore how a
state-industry’s distance to the Indian technological frontier and state speciﬁc
labor market institutions can help us understand rising within three-digit industry
inequality across the 1980–1997 period.12
12. Thepaperiscontributiontothegrowingliteraturethatemphasisesthataﬁrm’sdistancefromthe
technological frontier will determine the extent to which it beneﬁts from entry. Sabirianova, Svenjar,
and Terrell (2004), for example, ﬁnd that greater presence of foreign ﬁrms in a given industry has
a negative average effect on the productive efﬁciency of Czech and Russian domestic ﬁrms but the
effect is positive on the efﬁciency of other foreign-owned ﬁrms.“zwu0218” — 2005/5/21 — page 302 — #12
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4. Conclusions
The world has tended to divide between those who are for or against liberaliza-
tion. Reality it turns out is more nuanced—there can be no a priori assumption
that an industry in a particular region of a country will beneﬁt from or be harmed
by liberalization. Consistent with our theoretical model we ﬁnd that entry dereg-
ulation elicited heterogeneous responses from industries in the same three-digit
sectorbutlocatedindifferentstatesofIndia.Thisisanimportantﬁndingasitsug-
geststhatactionsbyﬁrmstoupgradetechnologicalcapabilityorbypolicymakers
to improve the institutional environment will have a central bearing on whether
industry in a given sector and state beneﬁts from or is harmed by the process
of economic liberalization. Identiﬁcation of policies that enable local industry to
beneﬁt from economic liberalization is where the research frontier now lies. The
combination of economic theory and microeconomic data sources, together with
an emphasis on incentives and technology, provides a fruitful avenue for further
research on the microeconomics of industrial development.
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